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1. Introduction 
The threat of climate change due to the accumulation of carbon dioxide, as weU other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere has become recently a major economic and political 
issue. There is by now a general consensus that the socioeconomic consequences of global 
warming could be very harmful to our planet, and could be even disastrous for sorne geographic 
areas or countries. This attitude was reflected on the Convention for the Climate Change organized 
by the United Nations in Kioto (Japan), in December 1997, and in which as many as 160 countries 
participated. The main issue at stake for the participants was to control their GHGs emissions in 
order to achieve a stabilization ofthe global GHGs emissions in 2010 to their level of 1990. This 
stabilization can be only achieved if the most-industrialized countries can commit to a substantial 
decrease of their poUutants. The agreement reached in Kioto, a 5.2% emission reduetion on 
average for the 39 most-developed countries, is a satisfaetory first step towards the stabilization of 
the global GHGs emissions. In particular, the EU has committed to a reduetion of its emissions by 
8% (which however will not be distributed evenly among its country members). The EU's common 
posture is that an 8% reduction ofits emissions level in 2010, with respect to their level of 1990, 
can be achieved exclusively through a wide diffusion ofthe Best Available Technologies (BATs) in 
their most polluting sectors (such as transportation, industrial sector, energy produetion etc.). 
Therefore, the investigation ofthe economic forces that facilitate, or hinder, the diffusion ofexisting 
"clean" technologies becomes all the more important. Yet, the literature on the diffusion of green 
technologies is rather scarce. 
Recently, a number of empirical studies investigate the private incentives for adoption of 
the Best Available Technology in the absence of environmental policies, as weU how these 
incentives are inf1uenced by policies such as emission taxes and innovation subsidies2• Boetti and 
2 Velthuijsert (1993) discusses factors hindering the diffusion of energy-saving technologies. For a 
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adoption process innovations. 
We analyze both the pre-commitment and the preemptive equilibria of the adoption game. 
If there are long information lags, or it is prohibitively costIy for a fum to alter its adoption plans, 
firm i can pre-commit at date O to an implementation date T;. If, on the contrary, there are no 
information lags and moreover, altering adoption plans has no cost for a firm, each fum adopts 
preemptive/y to prevent, or delay, adoption by its opponent. As a result, fums' profits are equal in 
the preemptive equilibrium. We are thus able to investlgate the extent to which diffusion rates 
depend on the flexibility a firm has in altering its plans of implementation of the green technology. 
Further, by studying a differentiated industry with symmetric demands, we are able to explore the 
impact ofproduct differentiation on the rate ofdiffusion ofthe clean technology. 
It is shown that, as the tax rate on emissions increases, firms adopt earlier the abatement 
technology in both the preemptive and pre-commitment equilibria. The diffusion pattern of the 
green technology depends on the type ofmarket competition, the degree ofproduct differentiation, 
the ability of firms to precommit, or not, to a specific adoption date, as well the size of the market 
and the degree to which the innovation reduces firms unitary emissions. In particular, in both the 
pre-commitment and preemptive equilibria, the Cournot follower always adopts earlier than the 
Bertrand follower. Also, in a pre-commitment equilibrium the Bertrand leader adopts earlier than 
the Cournot leader, but only if the goods are sufficientIy close substitutes. The opposite is true for 
lower values of substitutability. However, in a preemptive equilibrium the Bertrand leader adopts 
always earlier than the Cournot leader. 
Our findings suggest that the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the market imperfections 
cannot be corrected through a· uniform tax on emissions. For each firm, there exists an emissions 
tax rate inducing the firm to adopt the clean technology at the socially optimal date, but these tax 
finns compete in prices or quantities. 
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Botteon (1996) report that a widespread adoption of sorne energy-saving technologies is likely to 
lead to a reduetion in C02 emissions ofapproximately 10% compared to 1990 levels. However, in 
the absence ofany environmental policy, this reduetion could be only ofthe order of2.5%. In this 
light, the design of environmental policies influences the firms' incentives to adopt an abatement 
technology and hence plays a crucial role in their effeetiveness to reduce emissions. 
On the other hand, to my knowledge, there is hardly any theoretical paper addressing the 
issue ofdiffusion ofgreen technologies. The exception is Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) where the 
incentives ofa firm to adopt a clean technology under different environmental policies are analyzed. 
However, this paper assumes awayany strategic considerations3. For instance, when firms compete 
in the market and also face emissions taxes, a firm may have incentive to adopt earlier the clean 
technology to reduce the tax burden on its emissions and thus gain market share from its rivals. 
This paper analyzes the firms' incentives to adopt an existing abatement technology (for 
instance, the BAT) in a differentiated industry where two firms compete in prices, or quantities, in 
the product market. Pollution is a by-product of their produetion process, and firms' emissions are 
taxed at arate 'l'. The firms choose their dates of adoption of a green technology that becomes 
available in the market at time O. A firm, by adopting the green technology, can reduce its per unit 
of output emissions, and thus decrease its emissions tax burden. The costs of purchasing and 
implementing the green technology decreases, at a decreasing rate, over time. These costs may 
decline substantially as the development horizon becomes longer due to either learning-by-doing or . 
discussion of sorne issues conceming the payback time ofa green technology see Krause et al. (1993). 
3 Note, however, that there is an extensive strategic-theoretic literature on the related subject of 
diifusion of cost-reducing innovations. Reinganum (1981a&b, 1983), Fudenberg & Tirale (1985) and 
Quirmbach (1986» analyze a homogeneous industry, while Petrakis (1994) studies a differentiated industry. 
Reinganum (1981a&b, 1983) investigates the diifusion ofnew technologies in an oligopoly where each firm 
can cornmit to a specific adoption date, while Fudenberg & Tirale (1985) consider the oppositecase where 
firms can preempt their rivals. Quirmbach (l986) compares the diifusion rates under alternative innovation 
market structures and shows that, in a precornmitmerit equilibrium, the rate of diffusion is faster in market 
structure A than in B ifand only if all the incremental benefits ofadopting the new technology are larger in A 
than in B. Petrakis (l994) extends the aboye analyses in the case of a differentiated product market where 
2 
current technology. 
At date t=0 an abatement technology that reduces emissions is available in the market. A 
fum can acquire the green technology at any date ~O and reduce thereafter its unitary emissions to 
A.-~J O<~<A.. Thus, the green technology reduces the finn's "effective" marginal cost by tOo Let k(t) 
be the present value of the costs of purchasing and implementing the green technology by date t. 
As it is standard in this literature, we assume that the current cost, k(t)erl, is decreasing over time, at 
a decreasing rate; that is, (k(t)erl) '<O and (k(t)erl) ''>0, where r is the interest rate, 0<r<1 (see e.g. 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1985)). Due to either economies of learning, or new results from basic 
research facilitating the adoption' process, adoption costs typically decline as the development 
horizon becomes longer. To avoid comer solutions, we further assume that (a) limt-4J k(t)=-limt-4J 
k(t) = 00, a sufficient condition for immediate adoption to be prohibitively costly; and (b) 
limt--k(t)erl= O, a condition guaranteeing that all adoptions occur in finite time. Finally, we assume 
that no further green innovations are anticipated in the industry. 
The market operates every date ~O. Market demands are stationary over time. Following 
Dixit (1979), the representative consumer's utility over the differentiated goods (Xl, X~ and the 
numeraire good mis, 
U(XI. x~ = a(xl + x~ - (x/ + 2YXlX2 + xi)!2 + m (1) 
where a> CO+íA. and 0<'1<1. The assumption that utility is linear in the numeraire good eliminates 
income effects and allows us to perform partial equilibrium analysis. This specification of U(.) 
generates a linear symmetric demand system, 
PI = a - Xl - YX2 (2) 
which permits us to study how the adoption timing of the green technology depends upon the 
substitutability of the two goods. The latter is measured by the parameter 'l. As '1 increases the 
commit to a speeifie poliey. 
5 
-----------_._--¡---------------------
rates differ among finns. Therefore, subsidization of the implementation costs of the green 
technology, coupled with a uniform tax on emissions, is necessary for the social optimum diffusion 
pattem to be restored. Further, the right mix ofpolicy tools is sensitive to all the faetors mentioned 
aboye. 
The paper is organized as follows. Seetion 2 presents the model and outlines the basic 
assumptions. It also analyzes the per-period produet market competition under cost asymmetries. 
In seetion 3 the adoption pattems in a pre-commitment equilibrium are derived and compared when 
finns are competing a la Coumot, or a la Bertrand, in the product market. Section 4 derives and 
compares those adoption patterns observed in a preemptive equilibrium. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2. The Model 
We consider an economy with an oligopolistic sector, consisting oftwo firms that produce 
differentiated goods, and a competitive numeraire sector. The firms possess identical constant 
returns to scale technologies and compete in quantities, or in prices, in the product market. The 
marginal cost of production equals co. Pollution of the environment is a by-product of the firms' 
production process. In particular, one unit of output produced with the current technology 
generates ), units of emissions. Firms face an exogenously given per-unit of emissions tax, T. We 
assume that T has been chosen by the government in the past, and that the government has the 
ability to commit to a specific polic/, Then a firm, due to its emissions, has an additional cost, AT, 
per unit of output. Therefore, c=co+TA is the effective marginal cas! of a finn producing with its 
4 Since the tax rate aggravates the finn's emissions only during the production stage, the government 
ofien has incentive to alter its emissions tax level after a finn has adopted the green teehnology. A finn then 
will decide on its adoption date taking into account that the government's policy will change according to the 
number offinns that have already adopted the green teehnology. In this paper we abstract from issues oftime 
consistency of the government policy. We will assume throughout that the government ¡sable to credibly 
4 
quantities? As we will see, the answer is no. As in Bester & Petrakis (1993) there is an additional 
eifect, the mar/ret share effect, which plays an important role. Whenever the green technology 
leads to a substantial increase of its market share, the finn has a stronger incentive to adopt the 
innovation earlier since the reduction of its eifective marginal cost applies to a higher volume of 
production. As previously, we restrict ourselves to parameter values for which both finns operate
. . 
in the market. This happens ifand onIy ifp¡B(C¡, C.J>Ci. From (5) this holds if)'<)'B(ÍJ,A,t5), where )'B is 
implicitIy defined by )'B=!'/c[2-)'i}/2. Thus, )'B< )'C. 
3. Adoption Patterns under Pre-commitment 
In this section we assume that firms can pre-commit to a specific adoption date. At date 0, 
firm i chooses its adoption date T;. Firms then compete in the product market each date ~O. 
Adoption date refers to the date by which the green technology can be implemented. In general, 
implementation of a new technology requires long term plans that can be altered later, but onIy at 
sorne cost. Pre-cornmitment at date Ois then a time-consistent behavior for the finn onIy ifthe costs 
of altering the adoption plans are prohibitively high. In this case, the threat of altering one's 
adoption date as a response to its rival's past actions is not credible. 
Let 7T:om, 7T:2m be the per-period profits when none, or both firms have adopted the green 
technology. Also, 7T:t, 7T:p be the per-period profits ofthe leader (finn that has already adopted), and 
the follower (firm that has not yet adopted), m=C,B. Then 7T:Om=7T:m(Co+rA,co+TJ.), 7T:2m=7T:m(Co+rA-rt5, 
T;m to maximize its discounted sum of profits: 
nm(T T )=IT¡ m -rtdt+ITJ m -rtdt+I"" m -rtdt-k(T)J J,2 otroe T¡trle TJ1!2 e ¡ (6) 
nm(T T )=JT¡ m -rtdt+JTJ m -rtdt+I"" m -rtdt-k(T)2 10 2 O tro e T¡trfe TJtr2 e 2 
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goods become better substitutes, and for Fl they are perfect substitutes. As }' goes to zero, each 
firm becomes virtually a monopolist for its producto For tractability reasons, define p=r/(a-ca). As 
(a-ca) is a measure ofthe market size, p represents the emissions tax rate per unit ofmarket size. 
We first analyze Coumot competition. Given the demand system (2), firm i chooses X¡ to 
maximize profits, [preJx¡, where c¡ is its effective marginal cost which, ofcourse, depends on how 
green the firm's technology is. Then the equilibrium per-period quantities are, iJ=1,2, 
xF(c¡,c) = [2(a - cJ-}'(a - c)]I(4 - 1) (3) 
and the equilibrium per-period profits are, 7rF(c¡,c)=[xF(c¡,c)/. Firm i's adoption ofthe abatement 
technology decreases its effective marginal cost, and thus increases its market share, xF, and 
decreases the market share ofits rival, xF Tbis latter effect is strategicalIy advantageous for firm i, 
since from (2) its own price is negatively related to the firmj's quantity. Thus, under emissions 
taxes, quantity competition creates a positive strategic effect for green innovations. To avoid 
comer solutions, we restrict attention to the range of the substitutability parameter where both 
finns are always active in the market. From (3), this is the case ifand onIy if}'< }'c(p,).., J), where }'c= 
min[l, 2(1+pÁ)/(1+pÁ-pJ)). 
We now analyze Bertrand competition. By inverting (2) we obtain the demand functions 
X¡ = [(a -p¡)-y(a -p~]I(J-'¡); X2 = [(a - p2)-}'(a -p¡)]I(1_}'2) (4) 
Firm i chooses p¡ to maximize its profits [p¡-cJx¡. Then the equilibrium prices are, iJ = 1,2, 
p¡B(C¡, c) = [(2+ y)(1-y)a+2c¡+ yc]/(4-1) (5) 
and the equilibrium per-period profits are, 7r¡B(c¡,c)=[pNc¡,c)-ctf/(1-1). When firm i adopts the 
green technology, its effective marginal cost decreases, and thus both pl and p/ .decrease. The 
latter is disadvantageous for firm i, because its output is positively related with Pj. Contrary to 
Coumot, Bertrand competition creates a negative strategic effect. Now, does tbis imply that firms 
competing in prices always adopt the abatement technology later than if they were competing in 
6 
Proposition 1: In a pre..commitment equilibrium. all the adoptions of the green 
technology occur earlier when (i) the tax rate on emissions is higher. (ii) the effectiveness of the 
green technology in reducing emissions is higher. (iii) the initial emissions-output rate is higher 
and (iv) the market size is larger. 
We tum now to the comparison of the adoption timing pattems of Coumot and Bertrand 
markets. Let g(p,lJ)=2(1+pA)I[2(J+pA)+plJ]. It can be easily checked that g<YB for all (P.lJ). 
Proposition 2 surnmarizes the results: 
Proposition 2: Let Y<YB. Then in apre-commitment equilibrium: 
(i) For each (p,lJ) there is a g(p,lJ) such that Tr<T/for y<g and Tr>T/ for y>g. Moreover. 
g(.) is decreasing in both p and lJ. 
(ji) T2C <T/ for all y. 
Proof: From (8) and (10), ]¡c>l/ if and only if [(2-y)(1+pA)-y(J+PA-plJ)]y3plJ/(J-l)(4-ll>o, or 
equivalently if (1+pA)I(1+pA-plJ»y/(2-y), which is true if y<g. Also from (9) and (11), 1/>1/ if 
and only if [2(J-y)(1+pA)+(2-y)plJ]lplJ/(1-f)(4-ll>o. which is always true. Then by (7) we 
obtain the results. Q.E.D. 
The intuition for part (i) is that for low values of y the difference in the strategic effect 
under Coumot and Bertrand competition is dominant. While as y increases the market share effeet 
(Bester & Petrakis (1993)) becomes more important. In fact, when the two cornmodities are poor 
substitutes their demands are hardly related, so a firm' s output hardly differs in the two types of 
market. Thus the reduction of the total effective costs due to adoption is ofthe same magnitude in 
both Bertrand and Coumot markets. However, for low values of y the innovation is more 
profitable for a Coumot leader· because it decreases its rival's output whereas for a Bertrand leader 
it decreases its competitor's price. Therefore, a Bertrand leader will adopt in a later moment when 
the implementation costs ofthe green technology are lower. 
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The first order conditions of(6) are: 
(7) 
Let /¡m=1rr-1rom, and It=1r2m-1rp. l¡m is then finn i's incremental benefit from the adoption of 
the green technology in market m. Then from (3) we obtain the incremental benefits of the 
leader and the folIower in the Coumot market: 
lle = 4(a-cofpJ[(2-y)(J+p).)+pJ)/(4-'¡f (8) 
l/ = 4(a-cofpJ[(J+p)')(2-y)+pJ(J-y))/(4-'¡f (9) 
Also, from (5) we get the corresponding expressions for the Bertrand market 
l/ = (a-cofpJ(2-f)[2(J+p).)(J-y)(2+y)+pJ(2-1))/(J-l)(4-y2f (10) 
II = (a-cofpJ(2-'¡)[2(J+p)')(1-y)(2+y)+pJ(2-'¡-2y))/(J-'¡)(4--If (11) 
Thus l¡m>Oand lt>lt for all p,J»O and O<y<l in both markets. Moreover, Ir is increasing in p, 
J, ). and (a-co). Both the leader's and the foIlower's incremental benefit from adopting the green 
technology increase with the emissions tax rate, as firms save more on tax bilIs. These incremental 
benefits increase also with the effectiveness of the green technology in reducing a firm's per-unit 
emissions. FinalIy, the higher a firm's emissions with the current technology, or the larger the size 
ofthe market, the higher are the firm's incremental benefits from adoption. 
Now, given (7), Tr depends onIy on l¡m and by our assumption on k(.), we get TI m> T2mfor 
m=B,C. As Quirmbach (1986) noted, the diffusion ofnew technologies in the market is not due to 
strategic behavior, but rather to a pattem ofdecreasing incremental benefits. Therefore, in order to 
compare adoption timing pattems under different market structures, we need onIy compare their 
respective incremental benefits. Note further that Tr is decreasing in p, J, ). and (a-coj. The 
foIlowing proposition surnmarizes the results: 
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The leader then, facing preemption, wiII innovate at an earlier moment such· that the follower is 
indifferent between adopting just before that moment and adopting much later. Thus, in a 
preemptive equilibrium the Rent-Equalization Principie holds. 
The specification of the game is the same except that history now matters. As a result we 
need to look for time consistent innovative behavior. Once the leader has adopted the new 
technology, the follower's adoption is a one-player decision problem. It chooses T2m to maximize its 
profits ll2m([¡, T2) (given in (6» with the only restriction that T2 m;zrr. Thefirst-order condition of 
this problem is the same as in the pre-commitment equilibrium, and is given by (7) with T2m 
replacing T2m. Therefore, in both the preemptive and the pre-commitment equilibria the follower 
adopts at the same date, Le. T2m=T2m for m = C,B. 
Further, from the Rent Equalization Principie, Tr is detennined by equating the discounted 
(12) 
with 7rt and 7rt, the leader's and follower's flow ofprofits respectively, in market m, m=C,B. Note, 
given T2m=T2m the leader's optimal adoption date depends only on the differential ofthe per-period 
profits ofbeing the leader and being the follower. This is the preemptive incentive (see e.g. Katz & 
Shapiro (1987». A comparison of the preemptive incentives created by Bertrand and Cournot 
markets is given in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: For all Y<YBll the preemptive incentives in Bertrand and Cournot marlrets 
are equal, i.e. 7rF - 7rf = 7rP -7rf. Moreover, the preemptive incentive increases with p, lJ, A. and 
(a-Ca). 
Proof: Using (3) and (5), we have 7rF-7rf = (a-co/f2(J+pA.)+plJ}plJ/(4-i) = 7rP-7rf. Q.E.D. 
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On the other hand, when the goods are very close substitutes, an innovation that reduces 
the eifective marginal cost of a finn has a significant impact on its market share. Especially, if y is 
close enough to YB, the adoption ofgreen technology by the leader reduces its rival's market s~are 
almost to zero. In Coumot competition, the rival's reduetion ofmarket share is less drastic, because 
YB<YC implies that the follower stays with a "decent" market share even after the leader's adoption. 
Therefore, for high values of y the Bertrand market creates a stronger incentive for the leader to 
adopt the green technology than the Coumot market. The market share eifect dominates and the 
leader adopts earlier in price competition. 
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 tells us that a Coumot follower always adopts earlier than the 
Bertrand follower. The strategic effeet dominates the market share eifect for all substitutability 
values. For low values of y the intuition is given aboye. But for high y it is the strength of price 
competition that matters: post-adoption profits do not increase much, even if the market share of 
the fol1ower increases substantially. This is due to the fierce competition between firms that are 
producing very similar goods. The post-innovation competition is much softer for a Coumot 
follower, thus its profits increase sufficientIy despite the fact that its market share increases much 
less than the Bertrand follower' s. 
4. Adoption patterns in the Preemptive Equilibrium 
If adoption is perfectIy observable and instantaneous, and if the costs of altering adoption 
plans are rather insignificant (Fudenberg & Tirole (1983), Riordan (1992)), a finn canoot credibly 
commit to maintain its date of the implementation of the green technology regardless of what 
happened in the past. In a pre-commitment equilibrium the leader makes higher profits than the 
follower. However, if preemption is possible this cannot happen. The follower would have 
incentive to adopt the new technology just before the leader does in order to increase its profits. 
10 
convex, the right hand tenn of(14) in square brackets [..]< r{C'(tl)(t:z-tl) + (C(tl)-C(tV)}<O. Thus, 
I(tl. tv is decreasing in tI and in t2 by the symmetry of (13). Hence, 1:/>-r/ implies I(tl. 1:/)< 
1(tl,1:/). Then from (12) and Proposition 3 we have 1:/<1:F Finally, the second part of the 
Proposition 4 is a direct consequence ofPropositions 1 ~d 3. Q.E.D. 
The leader in a Bertrand market always adopts the green technology earlier than the 
Coumot leader. In fact, the leader under price competition enjoys the leadership longer than under 
quantity competition. Given that the preemptive incentives per-period are the same in both 
markets, the leader has a stronger overall incentive to preempt in a Bertrand than in a Coumot 
market. 
5. Conclusions 
In recent years, there is a growing interest of scientists and politicians in a number of 
environmental issues, such as the global warming associated with the greenhouse effect, the 
depletion of the ozone layer, the acid rain etc. The c1imate change due to global warming has 
received much attention as it is expected to cause major economic or natural damages to many 
countries or areas. Currently, there is a widespread convietion that the concentration of GHGs 
could be stabilized in 2010 at its 1990 level, and thus global warming could be avoided to a major 
extent, if the Best Available Technologies (BATs) could be implemented by the majority of the 
countries. Under this light, it becomes all the more important the design of policies from the 
governments that provide the right incentives for the private sector to adopt the existing clean 
technologies. 
My paper contributes to this line of research by studying the firms' incentives to adopt an 
abatement technology in a differentiated oligopolistic industry where firms compete in prices, or 
quantities. The finns, faced with a tax on their emissions, have incentiv~ to adopt the green 
13 
Tbis result is rather specific to the linear demand structure. Nevertheless, it suggests that the 
preemptive incentives in Coumot and Bertrand competition are ofien of similar magnitude in a 
broader cIass of demand conditions. The intuition is that for fixed y, the Bertrand rÍtarket is more 
competitive than the Coumot market. Tbis suggests a Iarger profit differential between the low-cost 
leader and the bigh-cost follower in the. Bertrand market. However, the Ieader's adoption 
generates positive extemalities for the follower in the Bertrand market, but negative extemalities in 
the Coumot market. The Iatter counterbalances the competitiveness effect. 
As we saw aboye, the foIlower adopts at the same time in both the pre-cornmitment and the 
preemptive equilibria. Further, the bigher the emissions tax is, or the bigher the effectiveness of the 
technology in reducing emissions, the earlier the foIlower adopts the green technology. The 
foIlowing proposition surnmarizes the results: 
Proposition 4: In a preemptive equilibrium, T/ < Tr. and T!> T2c lor al! y and (p,~). 
Moreover. al! the adoptions 01 the green technology occur earlier when (i) the tax rate on 
emissions is higher, (ii) the effectiveness 01 the green technology in reducing emissions is higher. 
(iii) the initial emissions-output rate is higher and (iv) the market size is larger. 
Proof: To compare the Ieader's optimal adoption date in a price-setting and a quantity-setting 
game, define 
(13) 
Let C(t)=k(t)ert• By assumption C(t) is strictIy decreasing and strictIy convexo Differentiating (13) 
wehave 
(14) 
By strict convexity of exp(x) we have exp{r(t;¡-t¡)}-J>r(t;¡-t¡). As C(t) is decreasing and strictly 
12 
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technology not only in order to reduce their tax burden, but also to steal business from their rivals. 
The higher is the emission tax chosen by the government, the sooner the finns adopt the abatement 
technology. The diffusion pattem depends on a number of market and technological parameters, 
such as the type of competition (Coumot or Bertrand), the substitutability between the goods, the 
ability, or not, offinns to precommit to a specific adoption date, the size of the market and on how 
drastica1ly the emissions are reduced by the clean technology. The analysis thus provides further 
insights for the design ofenvironmental policies aiming at correcting the inefficiencies ofthe laissez-
faire. 
However, the design of optimal policies would require an estimation of the damage 
function for the countl)' (or all countries on the globe as it is the case ofGHGs). This task is left for 
further research. Note, however, that my findings suggest that the socia1ly optimal diffusion pattem 
canoot be implemented through the use of a uniform emissions tax. It would rather require an 
appropriate mix of emissions taxes and subsidies on green technologies adoption costs. Another 
important issue that is not treated here is the credibility ofgovernment policies. If the government 
canoot commit to a level ofemissions tax, then the firms would decide on their adoption dates as if 
the policy were chosen after their own adoption decision. 
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